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INTRODUCTION
[A] patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy.
–Justice Fortas1
One of the most important questions in patent policy today is
whether the acts of making and using a patented invention for research purposes should be exempt from infringement liability. The
basic idea, as Justice Fortas hinted in 1966, is to ensure that those
who obtain patents can use the monopoly power inherent in the
patent grant to capture profits from competing sales and other
commercial activity, but not to stifle the research and experimentation that promotes innovation and helps government officials evaluate the health and safety risks associated with new technological
developments.
Appropriately, the research exemption (also known as the experimental use doctrine) has been the subject of significant legal
scholarship and at least one major congressional inquiry over the
1

Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966).
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last thirty years.2 Yet much of the legal scholarship has focused on
normative questions like whether the law should have an exemption and what form it should take. Less attention has been given to
the doctrine’s legal and political history, or to the arguments and
economic interests of the individuals and institutions that have
shaped the law in this area into its current convoluted form.3
The call for such an analysis is amplified by the appearance,
over the last decade, of several pivotal studies of the political economy of intellectual property law, emphasizing changes in the law
since the 1970s. These studies tend to be “horizontal” in the sense
of analyzing large policy regimes and revealing broad themes. The
narrowest among them focuses on the entire patent system (Scherer),4 while others go even broader to include legal developments in
copyright (Landes and Posner)5 and finance (Coriat and Weinstein).6 Few if any “vertical” studies trace the historical development of a single issue within the patent system to illustrate or challenge arguments about broader themes in the political economy of
intellectual property law.
This Article approaches the research exemption, and related
legal developments, as a case study in the political economy of patent law. Part I recounts the history of the research exemption,
touching briefly on historical origins but emphasizing developments since the 1970s in legislative, executive, and judicial forums.
It also examines changes during the same time frame in related
2

See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1065–66 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, No
“Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (2000). On the
congressional inquiry, see infra Section I.F.2.
3
For a notable exception, emphasizing the relationship between the common law
exemption and biotechnology policy, see Maureen Boyle, Leaving Room For Research: The
Historical Treatment of the Common Law Research Exemption in Congress and the Courts, and
Its Relationship to Biotech Law and Policy, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 269 (2009).
4
F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167 (2009).
5
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2004).
6
Benjamin Coriat & Olivier Weinstein, Patent Regimes, Firms and the Commodification
of Knowledge, 10 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 267 (2012).
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areas of patent law, like the Bayh-Dole legislation and the attempted repeal of state immunity from patent infringement liability. These legal developments indirectly affected the research exemption, or implicated similar concerns about imbalance in the patent system and the use of patents to tax, control, or inhibit research activity.
Part II analyzes this history to illustrate and expand upon two
major themes in the political economy of patent law, namely the
surprising persistence of faulty economic ideology in patent policymaking and the institutional bias exhibited by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in shaping modern patent law. One
major conclusion is that together these forces have created an excessively complex and ill-designed policy environment that is placing a significant strain on the national research system, a strain that
executive agencies and the courts have tried to alleviate through ad
hoc agreements and modifications of other patent doctrines, like
the doctrine of subject matter eligibility.
I. THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE RESEARCH EXEMPTION
The research exemption has a long and colorful history in
American law. Legendary Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story first
articulated the idea in a case from 1813.7 But since the middle of the
1970s, the idea of protecting future research and development from
patent infringement liability has endured increasing criticism and
attack in both judicial and legislative forums. In 1985, an administrative law court interpreted the Patent Act in a way that rendered
obsolete a specific research exemption codified in a separate statutory scheme, the Plant Variety Protection Act.8 In 1990, Congress
rejected an attempt to clarify and codify Story’s common law doctrine and, at the same time, passed a bill to eliminate the immunity
from patent infringement that states and their universities historically enjoyed.9 And in 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit narrowed Story’s common law doctrine so significantly that

7
8
9

See infra text accompanying notes 12–17.
See infra text accompanying note 78.
See infra Section I.F.
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it no longer has much impact.10 One notable exception runs contrary to this trend: in 1984, Congress created a robust research exemption for patents on pharmaceuticals that require regulatory approval, and the Supreme Court has thus far remained stalwart in
protecting that statutory exemption from judicial attempts to narrow it.11 Overall, these developments have created a complex and
convoluted system when it comes to protecting research and development from patent infringement liability, a convoluted framework that is proof of political forces at work.
A. The Research Exemption is Born: Whittemore v. Cutter and
Sawin v. Guild (1813)
A research exemption has existed in American common law
since at least 1813 when Justice Story decided Whittemore v. Cutter.
In this patent infringement case, the trial judge instructed the jury
that “the making of a machine fit for use, and with a design to use
it for profit” violated the Patent Act of 1800.12 The defendant (oddly) objected to this instruction on grounds that making a patented
machine can never be infringement, whether made with a design to
use it for profit or not.13 On the defendant’s motion for a new trial,
Justice Story (who was riding circuit in Massachusetts) denied that
objection.14 In doing so, he noted that the instruction was favorable
to the defendant, and that the trial judge had appropriately concluded “that it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”15
Justice Story also suggested that the exemption flowed from the
definition of the statutory acts constituting infringement, and not
from any perceived lack of harm to the patent holder. The defendant had also argued that the making of a machine alone, without
use of the machine for profit, cannot be an act of patent infringe10

See infra text accompanying notes 146–53.
See infra Section I.D.
12
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 Fed. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
13
Id.
14
Id.; see also Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent
Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 619 (1985).
15
Whittemore, 29 Fed. Cas. at 1121.
11
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ment since the patent holder suffers no damages from the act of
making the machine.16 Justice Story denied that objection on
grounds that every act of infringement is actionable, even if only for
nominal damages.17 Thus, the exemption’s legal basis primarily lies
in the contention that research and experimentation are not actionable instances of “making” or “using” an invention, regardless of
whether those acts technically cause any harm or not. In recent
years, the analysis has focused more heavily on the intent prong of
Story’s framework or on the patent holder’s expectation (i.e.,
harm), but this early emphasis on categories of protected conduct
arguably remains the most appropriate and useful way for thinking
about the research exemption.
Later that same year, Sawin v. Guild presented the question of
whether a sheriff can seize and sell a patented machine to satisfy a
judgment against the owner.18 The owner of the patented machine,
John Sawin, sued the sheriff, John Guild, alleging that the sale of
the patented machine was an act of infringement.19 The court entered a nonsuit in favor of the sheriff on grounds that such a sale
does not constitute an act of infringement within the meaning of
the patent laws.20 Justice Story, who also decided Sawin, noted that
the plain language of the Patent Act must be interpreted in a “reasonable fashion” so as not “to introduce public mischiefs,” and
that the expansive definition of an infringing “sale” must yield to
the broader public policy favoring orderly execution of judgments.21 Justice Story emphasized that this limitation on the definition of infringing sales flowed naturally from the same concerns
that motivated limitations on the definition of the infringing acts of
making and using a patented invention articulated in Whittemore.22
In the 169 years after Whittemore and Sawin, and before the
Federal Circuit entered the scene, the federal courts attempted to
further refine the scope of the common law exemption, and gener16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id.
Id.
Sawin v. Guild, 21 Fed. Cas. 554, 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
Id.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 555.
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ally invoked the exemption to protect those who wished to adapt an
invention to their own business purpose (i.e., to determine whether
or not to purchase or negotiate a license to a patented invention),
so long as they did not profit from the experimentation or adaptation itself.23 While seldom invoked or litigated, the exemption provided a well-known safe harbor for “philosophical experiment” as
well as for testing a patented invention, but fell short of protecting
experimentation for the purpose of improving or designing around
an invention with the intent to profit from that research in the future.
B. The Plant Variety Protection Act: A Special Statutory Exemption
for Plants that Reproduce Sexually (1970)
In 1970, Congress considered whether it should expand the
boundaries of patent eligible subject matter to include plants that
reproduce sexually.24 The prior Congress had investigated whether
the “plant section” of the Patent Act,25 which allowed patents for
plants that reproduce asexually, should simply be amended to also
allow patents on plants that reproduce sexually, but that approach
raised “[a] number of objections.”26 The 91st Congress therefore
considered and ultimately passed the Plant Variety Protection Act
of 1970 (“PVPA”), which allowed the Department of Agriculture
to issue “certificates” (similar to patents) for novel varieties of
sexually reproduced plants.27
The purported purpose of the PVPA was “to encourage the
development of novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants and to
make them available to the public . . . thereby promoting progress
in agriculture in the public interest.”28 The Department of Agriculture and incumbent seed breeders aligned unanimously in favor of

23

Hantman, supra note 14, at 638–39.
Plant Variety Protection Act: Hearing on S. 3070 Before Subcomm. on Agric. Research
and Gen. Legis. of S. Comm. on Agric. and Forestry, 91st Cong. (1970) [hereinafter 1970
Plant Variety Protection Act Hearing].
25
35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012).
26
S. REP. NO. 91-1246, at 3 (1970).
27
Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 and 28 U.S.C.); S. REP. NO. 91-1138, at 1 (1970).
28
S. REP. NO. 91-1138, at 1.
24
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the bill, arguing that legislation “is needed to provide incentive to
plant breeders to develop new and improved varieties.”29
This idea—that patents encourage or incentivize innovation—
is what we might call the “central dogma” of patent law, for it is
the standard refrain of those seeking to expand patent rights to encompass formerly un-patentable subject matter, or eliminate doctrines like the research exemption that narrow the reach of the patent grant. The merits of this hypothesis (and it is only a hypothesis) are discussed in Part II. Here, it is important simply to acknowledge that, despite the incredible frequency with which this
hypothesis is repeated in judicial and legislative settings, it is not
necessarily true for the patent system as a whole, nor is it a useful
way for comparing alternative policies and determining which is
optimal.
Importantly, the PVPA included a statutory research exemption, most likely because Congress wanted to ensure that American
farmers and seed companies could compete with agribusiness in
England and the nations of Western Europe, most of whom had
joined an organization—the International Union for the Protection
of Plant Varieties (“UPOV”)—that promulgated a series of legal
standards which included a research exemption.30 In essence, Con-

29

1970 Plant Variety Protection Act Hearing, supra note 24, at 1 (statement of Sen.
Jordan of N.C.); see also S. REP. NO. 91-1138, at 14 (1970) (stating that the Department of
Agriculture supports the bill and “believe[s] that it is desirable to provide incentive for
private enterprise to undertake the research and development required to produce novel
varieties of sexually produced plants”).
30
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 91-1605, at 1–2 (1970) (describing England’s and Western
Europe’s progress); Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1993: Hearing on S. 1406
Before the Subcomm. on Agric. Res., Conservation, Forestry, and Gen. Legis. of the S. Comm.
on Agric. Nutrition and Forestry, 103d Cong. 2 (1993) (arguing that the PVPA was enacted
in part “to alleviate the competitive disadvantage that American agriculture and breeders
face because European countries offered protection under UPOV”). For the text of the
exemption in the PVPA, see Plant Variety Protection Act § 114, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84
Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2544) (“The use and reproduction of a protected
variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement
of the protection provided under this [Act].”). The Act of 1961 of the International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants contained a form of research
exemption in Article 5(3), which permitted use of a protected variety without the
breeder’s permission “either for the utilization of the new variety as an initial source of
variation for the purpose of creating other new varieties or for the marketing of such
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gress may have simply “borrowed” the research exemption for
sexually reproduced plants from the UPOV legal regime, without
too much inquiry into its merits, so that American businesses could
compete on equal footing with foreign firms. Another possibility is
that the United States wished to one day join the UPOV, which it
ultimately did in 1981, and needed a research exemption to do so.31
During a Senate subcommittee hearing on the bill, one witness
noted the connection between the research exemption and the
bill’s purported purpose, in a way that anticipated the Bayh-Dole
Act a decade later.32 George Babcock, a manager from the Grower
Seed Association in Lubbock, Texas, argued that the research exemption would allow public research agencies—whom many cooperatives and small seed companies relied on—to continue their research agenda without the prospect of infringement liability and,
importantly, the potential revenue generated from intellectual
property protection would allow public agencies to invest more
money in research and development.33 Babcock therefore suggested that a broad safe harbor for research combined with stronger
patent rights for private firms and public agencies alike might
create an optimal balance in the law.34
Congress amended the PVPA in 1980 to eliminate an exclusion
that major soup companies had obtained for certain vegetables, and
to extend the term of protection by one year; but the debate over
the bill quickly went beyond these narrow proposals and into a
deeper assessment of the PVPA as a whole.35 Opponents of the
PVPA argued that it was eliminating genetic plant diversity and
encouraging the formation of monopolistic seed companies that
were driving up seed prices.36 Some advocates, including Representatives Tom Daschle and Tom Harkin, argued that while the
narrow amendments in the bill should become law, Congress would
varieties.” International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, art.
5(3), Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89.
31
Boyle, supra note 3, at 286–87.
32
1970 Plant Variety Protection Act Hearing, supra note 24, at 71–73 (statement of
George B. Babcock, Manager, Grower Seed Association).
33
Id. at 72.
34
Id.
35
Pub. L. No. 96-574, 94 Stat. 3350 (1980).
36
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1115, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6954, 6959.
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need to return to these broader issues at a later time.37 In contrast,
the American Patent Law Association argued in favor of the PVPA
because the United States was lagging behind other nations when it
comes to innovation in plant breeding, and that the patent laws
“provide strong incentives for industry to invest in research and
development.”38
The congressional hearings and reports on the 1980 amendments show that Congress believed the PVPA was a success.39 The
House subcommittee that reported favorably on the bill argued that
the PVPA had dramatically increased both private expenditures in
research and the number of new plant varieties available to farmers
in the marketplace, citing the sugar snap pea as an exemplary byproduct of the Act.40 Importantly, if one adopts that evidence as
proof of a beneficial causal effect (which is highly suspect), then
the PVPA is also evidence that a broad research exemption does
not significantly undermine the basic incentives provided in the
statutory scheme.
Just as with the original legislation, the debate over the PVPA
amendments also elicited insightful testimony from those who opposed the law. Cary Fowler, of the National Sharecropper’s Fund,
argued that the evidence relating increased research expenditures
and varieties to the PVPA was shaky at best, since research expenditures were on the rise long before the PVPA became law, and the
evidence on increased varieties was inappropriately counting varieties developed before the PVPA was enacted as evidence of postPVPA inventions.41 Fowler also invoked a study by the National
Academy of Sciences which described the purported successes relied on by the Carter administration as “fine-tuned adjustments”
to existing varieties and not “major breakthrough[s].”42
37

Id. at 40.
Plant Variety Protection Act: Hearing on S. 23, S. 1580, and S. 2820 Before the
Subcomm. on Agric. Res. and Gen. Legis. of the S. Comm on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry,
96th Cong. 143 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Plant Variety Protection Act Hearing] (statement
of Donald Dunner, President, American Patent Law Association).
39
See generally id.; H.R. REP. NO. 96-1115 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6954.
40
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1115, at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6954, 6957.
41
1980 Plant Variety Protection Act Hearing, supra note 38, at 117 (statement of Cary
Fowler, National Sharecroppers Fund).
42
Id.
38
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Fowler was also concerned about the PVPA’s impact on competition and research, and raised early warnings about the United
States’ interest in joining the UPOV. Specifically, Fowler noted
that domestic and international plant breeding organizations were
finding that patent rights over plants were restricting “the exchange of scientific information and breeding materials” and creating monopolistic markets that stifled innovation, despite existing
research exemptions.43 And, according to Fowler, the Carter administration had not explained why the United States should join
the UPOV in the first place, since “[t]here are strong suspicions
that the benefits to be derived [from joining] will flow to a handful
of multinational corporations who are attempting to gain entry into
foreign markets.”44
C. Bayh-Dole and the Reform of Rights in Publicly Funded Research
(1980)
In the same year that it debated amendments to the PVPA,
Congress also passed two laws that fundamentally altered the relationship between federal agencies (including federal laboratories),
universities, and private industry. In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act
created a presumption that universities or small businesses that
receive federal funding for research and development would retain
title to any patents stemming from that research.45 And the Stevenson-Wydler Act “required the principal government agencies conducting [research] in-house to set up Research and Technology
Applications offices” in order to “to negotiate exclusive patent licenses with industry for inventions resulting from agency research.”46 Later, in 1986, the Federal Technology Transfer Act
(“FTTA”) empowered government laboratories to enter into cooperative research arrangements with private industry, “with the

43

Id. at 119.
Id. at 122.
45
Scherer, supra note 4, at 183; see also Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2012)).
46
Scherer, supra note 4, at 183; see also Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–
3714).
44
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industrial partners retaining principal patent rights but paying
royalties to cooperating agencies and their inventor employees.”47
The political debates surrounding these controversial pieces of
legislation are described in detail in the law review literature, but a
few specific points about the Bayh-Dole Act deserve further discussion here.48 First, the Act’s proponents seem to have anticipated that the proliferation of patent rights flowing from publicly
funded research might lead to certain kinds of abusive behavior,
like refusing to commercialize an invention or asserting patent
rights in a manner that would harm public health or safety.49 At the
same time, the safeguards enacted to protect against those potential abuses are extremely cumbersome, which suggests that those
who supported the Act perceived the risk of abuse to be extremely
low. These safeguards have since come under significant scrutiny.50
Second, the Act’s adherents failed to anticipate the possibility
that the proliferation of patent rights in inventions developed with
federal money might be used to stifle or tax research and innovation.51 Perhaps as a result, there is no mention of the research exemption in either the House or the Senate reports, or in the transcript of the Senate hearing, on the bills that became the Bayh-Dole
Act.52 The prospect of an institution using patents to suppress or
attach onerous conditions to further experimentation simply was
not considered.
Finally, the Bayh-Dole Act and the related legislative reforms
of the 1980s significantly influenced the political dynamics in de47

Scherer, supra note 4, at 183; see also Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3710).
48
See Scherer, supra note 4, at 180–86; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research
and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663–95 (1996).
49
See Scherer, supra note 4, at 212.
50
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 293–95 (2003).
51
Id. at 302 (describing an example of this outcome with work on the NF-kB pathway).
52
See generally The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearing on S.
414 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307(II)
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6492; H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307(I) (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460; S. REP. NO. 96-480 (1979).
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bates over the research exemption by creating a new political interest group: that of the professionals working in university technology transfer offices, individuals who do not necessarily have the
same values or interests as academic scientists and whose responsibility is not to promote the public interest, but to generate revenue for their employer.53 Some legal scholars have since argued
that university technology transfer officials—organized under the
auspices of the Association of University Technology Managers
(“AUTM”)—now pose the most serious obstacle to patent reform
in the United States,54 even though there is limited evidence that,
as a whole, universities do more than break even under the BayhDole regime.55 This contention appears to have some support when
it comes to the research exemption. In 2004, when the National
Research Council and a prominent organization of intellectual
property lawyers announced their support for codification of a research exemption, the AUTM opposed that proposal.56 And in
2010, when an advisory group to the Department of Health and
Human Services recommended codification of a research exemp-

53

Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 303, 305–06 (noting that universities have
delegated their responsibilities under Bayh-Dole to technology transfer professionals
“who are not themselves academics” and “who see their primary job as bringing
licensing revenue into the university”).
54
See, e.g., Elizabeth Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (2006). Rowe’s argument
against the exemption is premised on the assumption that it would only apply to
universities, which is not necessarily true, but her examination of university interests in
current debates over the exemption is insightful nevertheless.
55
Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 1712 n.192.
56
See AIPLA Response to National Academies Report Entitled “A Patent System for the
21st Century,” AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N 2, http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/executive/
Documents/NAS092304.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TZ5-6TYB] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016)
(“Codifying such an exemption as recommended by the NAS Report, would remove the
uncertainty that now exists over the manner in which a patented invention can be used to
better understand and/or extend what is patented.”). I have been unable to obtain a
formal position on this issue from the AUTM. A copy of a webpage from autm.net,
cached by Google on July 12, 2015, says “AUTM Formal Positions—published:
03/19/2014 . . . Patent Law Research Exemption AUTM opposes a recommendation by
the American Intellectual Property Law Association to codify a research and
experimentation exception in the patent laws.” See Cached Search Results of AUTM
Website (on file with author).
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tion for certain kinds of genetic research, the AUTM opposed that
proposal as well.57
D. The Federal Circuit’s First Assault on the Research Exemption:
The Bolar Decision and the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984)
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit as a specialized court to hear all appeals from patent cases
in the federal district courts (as well as some other cases involving
the federal government).58 In doing so, Congress discounted various warnings that a specialized appellate court, with the unique
ability to create national precedent on patent law issues, would suffer from “tunnel vision” and be susceptible to being captured by
special interests.59
Within the first two years of its existence, the Federal Circuit
tried to limit the common law research exemption. In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., the court decided that “the
limited use of a patented drug for testing and investigation strictly
related to [Food and Drug Administration] drug approval requirements” was an infringing use under the Patent Act and was not
protected by the research exemption.60 The court ultimately held
that the research exemption was “truly narrow” and that it would
“not expand it under the present circumstances.”61
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit ignored cases
interpreting the research exemption that arose from the federal district and appellate courts, and chose to only consider precedent
from its predecessor court, the Court of Claims.62 The Federal
Circuit then disregarded three such cases where the Court of
Claims acknowledged the exemption, finding the statements in
those cases to be dicta or lacking precedential value, and relied on
the one case where the Court of Claims chose not to apply the ex57

Katherine L. Record, University Opposition to Unfettered Research: A New Bedfellow for
Biotech?, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 139 (2012).
58
See Scherer, supra note 4, at 191.
59
Id. at 187–88 (quoting Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 236 (1975)).
60
Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
61
Id. at 863.
62
Id. at 862–63.
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emption.63 The legal basis for taking such a narrow view of the relevant precedent is somewhat suspect, and reflects a certain degree
of reverse engineering in support of a pre-determined outcome.
Ironically, by the time the Federal Circuit decided the case,
Roche’s patent had expired, and because the sole remedy Roche
had requested was an injunction, the basic issue in the case was
moot.64 In other words, the Federal Circuit no longer had the power to enjoin Bolar from testing the patented drug for purposes of
obtaining regulatory approval because the patent had expired, and
so the only remedy left available to Roche was for monetary damages in the district court, damages which were “nominal” according to Roche’s own counsel.65 The Federal Circuit rendered a decision anyway, even though its decision threatened to upset negotiations over an expansive overhaul of drug regulation and patenting
that was before Congress at the time: the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Congress quickly amended the Hatch-Waxman Act to repeal
the Bolar decision.66 Overall, the Hatch-Waxman Act reflects a
bargain between generic and non-generic pharmaceutical manufacturers, where the former obtained the right to seek approval from
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) based on a simple
showing that the generic product was “bioequivalent” to a patented drug (thus avoiding the expense of clinical trials), and the
latter obtained longer patent terms to account for regulatory delays
at the FDA.67 After the Federal Circuit decided Bolar, Congress
amended the bill to allow drug manufacturers to infringe pharmaceutical patents “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law.”68

63

Id. at 863.
Id. at 865–67.
65
Id. at 866.
66
See Scherer, supra note 4, at 197 (noting that section 202 was dubbed the “Bolar
amendment”).
67
For a more thorough description of the bill’s history, see Scherer, supra note 4, at
195–99.
68
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 26 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2710
(“Proposed subsection (e)(1) provides that it shall not be an act of infringement to make,
use, or sell a patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a federal law which regulates the approval of drugs.”).
64
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Some of the issues specific to the Hatch-Waxman Act—
especially the bill’s focus on the length of patent terms for pharmaceutical companies—influenced the legislative debate over the research exemption in this context. For instance, opponents to the
exemption for the first time characterized the policy as a shortening
of the pharmaceutical industry’s patent terms and a taking of its
property. The Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks argued that the exemption “would serve as an unfortunate precedent curtailing the exclusionary rights accorded a
patentee during the patent term.”69 A member of the Board of Directors of Johnson & Johnson made the same argument, as did the
President and CEO of Hoffman-La Roche, adding that the exemption would also be an unconstitutional taking of property.70
The pharmaceutical industry’s emphasis on takings apparently
influenced the congressional analysis of the Bolar amendment, as
the House Committee on the Judiciary dedicated a significant portion of its report to rebutting the takings argument (persuasively)
under then-existing law.71 Subsequent legal developments have
proved this analysis sound.72 But even though the Committee reported favorably on the bill (including the Bolar provision), it also
speculated that “there would be no need” to create a similar exemption to allow, for example, engineers in the automobile industry to test a patented engine, because no regulatory regime blocked
car manufacturers from competing as soon as the patent expired.73
The report also contains no mention of Whittemore, Sawin, or any
other federal cases articulating the common law research exemption, suggesting that the House Judiciary Committee may not have
69

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S. 2748
Before S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 98th Cong. 164 (1984) (statement of Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents and
Trademarks).
70
Id. at 129, 132 (statement of Verne Willaman, a member of the Board of Directors of
Johnson & Johnson) (claiming that the provision would “shrink existing patent
protection” and is “clearly inequitable”).
71
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 61 n.18, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2721.
72
See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (holding that patents do not constitute property under the Takings Clause),
vacated in part on other grounds, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also id. at 1370 (Dyk,
C.J., concurring).
73
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(II), at 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714.
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even been aware of the doctrine’s legal origins. Similarly, the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce argued in favor of the
provision because “experimental activity does not have any adverse economic impact on the patent owner’s exclusivity during
the life of a patent.”74 These arguments do not accurately capture
the basic legal principles supporting the research exemption in a
broader form, a form not limited to testing of pharmaceuticals for
FDA approval. The basic principle is that making and using a patented drug for experimentation is arguably a type of activity that
the patent laws should promote rather than punish, irrespective of
any alleged impact on a patent’s term or the need to pass regulatory hurdles in order to enter the market once a patent expires.
E. The Death of the PVPA and its Special Research Exemption: Ex
parte Hibberd (1985)
In 1980, in the historic case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court determined that a genetically modified bacterium was
patentable (i.e., was eligible subject matter).75 The result is consistent with the general trend, in this period, toward expanding patentability, and this case is often credited, perhaps falsely, with ensuring that the patent system would accommodate the coming explosion in biotechnology research.76
But the decision also had one important unintended consequence. By proclaiming that a bacterium—a “living thing”—was
patentable under the Patent Act, the Supreme Court challenged
the basic assumption that had motivated Congress to pass the Plant
Patent Act (“PPA”) of 1930 and the PVPA of 1970. In other
words, when Congress passed the PVPA, it had done so on the
74

H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2679.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
76
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-888, at 38, 69 (1988). The House Committee on the Judiciary
inferred a causal relationship between the Chakrabarty decision and the four billion dollar
domestic biotechnology industry, and argued without evidence that “[t]he availability of
patent protection for biologically derived inventions has been the catalyst for the current
biotechnology industry.” Id. at 69. This argument (and others like it) relies on the
observation of concurrent increases in biotech investment and/or biotech patenting after
Chakrabarty, trends that are difficult to interpret given the many changes occurring in
patent law at this time (including the Bayh-Dole reforms), and which do not prove a
causal impact in any event. See id. at 39.
75
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premise that sexually reproduced plants could not be patented under the Patent Act.77 Ten years later, in Chakrabarty, the Supreme
Court suggested that this assumption was false.
Subsequently, an administrative law court housed in the Department of Commerce, known then as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”), used the Chakrabarty decision
to effectively repeal the PVPA. In Ex parte Hibberd, the BPAI held
that sexually reproduced plants can be patented under the Patent
Act, and so there were, in effect, two separate statutory regimes for
obtaining exclusive rights in plants that reproduce sexually.78 As a
practical matter, the ruling meant that patent applicants would always choose the Patent Act over the PVPA because the Patent Act
did not include statutory limitations on the patent holder’s rights,
like the farmer’s saved seed exemption or a statutory research exemption.
The BPAI’s reasoning has several flaws, but the most perplexing among them is the conclusion the BPAI reached regarding
Congress’ burden at the time it passed the PVPA. The BPAI approached the issue through the analytical framework of “implicit
repeals,” based on the fact that Congress did not, in the PVPA,
explicitly repeal section 101 of the Patent Act to the extent that section allowed for patents on plants that reproduce sexually.79 Yet
Congress did not explicitly repeal any part of the Patent Act because it did not believe it had to, as the legislative history makes
clear.80 Congress believed that the Patent Act did not allow patents
on plants that reproduce sexually, so it had no motivation for indi77

S. REP. NO. 91-1138, at 3 (1970); see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1605 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5082, 5083 (“No protection is available to those varieties of plants
which reproduce sexually, that is, generally by seeds.”); S. REP. NO. 91-1246, at 3 (1970).
78
Ex parte Hibberd, 1985 WL 71986, at *2–3 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 1985). In 1999, when
the United States acceded to the 1991 Act of the International Convention for the
Protection of New Plant Varieties, it did so pursuant to a reservation in Article 35(2) that
it can continue to provide protection for novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants “by
an industrial property title other than a breeder’s right [(i.e., under the Patent
Act)] . . . without applying this Convention to those varieties.” International Convention
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, art. 35(2), Mar. 19, 1991. As a result, the
United States’ participation in the Convention is now essentially pro forma.
79
Ex parte Hibberd, 1985 WL 71986, at *4–5.
80
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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cating otherwise.81 Because of the BPAI’s view of the law regarding
“implicit repeals,” Congress must explicitly repeal hypothetical
changes in the judicial interpretation of a statute that may or may
not come to pass in the coming decades. Curiously, the Supreme
Court sanctioned this view sixteen years later.82 In the majority
opinion of J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International,
Inc., the Court effectively ruled that in deciding what Congress intended to do when it passed the PVPA, it is important to ignore the
factual predicates and assumptions that motivated congressional
action if the Supreme Court presently disagrees with them.83
The J.E.M. dissent, authored by Justice Breyer, analyzed the
legislative history and concluded that “Congress intended the two
more specific statutes,” namely the PPA and the PVPA, “to exclude patent protection under” section 101 of the Patent Act “for
the plants to which the more specific Acts directly refer.”84 Justice
Breyer also acknowledged that the majority’s forced reading of the
statutory history effectively eliminated the PVPA’s statutory exemptions, including the research exemption.85
F. Congress Tackles the Research Exemption: The Patent
Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990
By the late 1980s, a host of patent reform measures were under
congressional consideration. The 101st Congress considered five
separate patent reform measures that had been raised in previous
81

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001).
83
Id. (“This does not mean, however, that prior to 1930 plants could not have fallen
within the subject matter of § 101. Rather, it illustrates only that in 1930 Congress believed
that plants were not patentable under § 101 . . . .”); see also id. at 135 (“Whatever
Congress may have believed about the state of patent law and the science of plant
breeding in 1930, plants have always had the potential to fall within the general subject
matter of § 101 . . . .”); see also id. at 141 (“The relevant statements in the legislative
history reveal nothing more than the limited view of plant breeding taken by some
Members of Congress who believed that patent protection was unavailable for sexually
reproduced plants. This view stems from a lack of awareness concerning scientific
possibilities.”).
84
Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85
Id. at 155 (“The Court has advanced no sound reason why Congress would want to
destroy the exemptions in the PVPA that Congress created. And the Court’s reading
would destroy those exemptions.”).
82
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legislative sessions, with all five of the measures bundled together
as different titles in the same bill, the Patent Competitiveness and
Technological Innovation Act of 1990 (“PCTIA”).86
Two of the measures in the PCTIA implicated the research exemption. The first proposed to repeal the immunity from infringement liability that the states—and their universities—enjoyed under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.87 The second proposed to
codify, once and for all, a broad research exemption with a carve
out only for “research tools.”88 The repeal of state sovereign immunity passed the House and the Senate and became law, while the
codification of the research exemption did not.
1. Repeal of State Sovereign Immunity Passes
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided a sovereign immunity case
in which it emphasized its prior holding that, absent a waiver of
immunity by a state, a lawsuit against a state (or its agencies) may
proceed only if Congress has the Constitutional authority to abrogate sovereign immunity and does so “by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”89 Following this
command, the Federal Circuit noted, in a separate case, that Congress had not stated its intent to repeal state sovereign immunity
for patent infringement under the Patent Act.90 Because of these
rulings, Congress entertained proposals to explicitly repeal state
immunity from patent infringement, and one of those proposals
was ultimately incorporated into the PCTIA. In this specific setting—where the Federal Circuit had indicated that it viewed that
common law research exemption as “truly narrow,” the Bolar exemption provided protection only for drug and medical device re86

H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990).
Id. §§ 301–303. Though sovereign immunity is a separate and distinct doctrine, of
constitutional and not common law origin, it accomplishes a similar purpose in the patent
context since the doctrine immunizes state agencies and universities (where much
experimentation takes place) from the risk of infringement liability.
88
Id. at §§ 401–403; H.R. REP. NO. 101-960(I), at 32 (1990).
89
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
90
Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 334 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Assuming the Congress has
the power to subject the states to patent infringement suits, a complex question we do not
resolve herein, we conclude, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Congress has
evidenced no intent to exercise such power in the patent statute.”).
87
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search, and the BPAI had effectively eliminated the statutory research exemption under the PVPA—sovereign immunity provided
a significant liability shield, allowing scientists at public universities
to ignore non-pharmaceutical patents in the course of their research. The proposal to repeal state sovereign immunity was intended to remove that shield.
Importantly, developments in international trade negotiations
influenced the debate over the repeal of state sovereign immunity.
At the time that Congress was considering the PCTIA, American
industry was in the midst of its efforts to extend U.S. patent standards to the rest of the world through the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, negotiations that resulted in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) agreement.91 A group
composed of the chief executives of thirteen major companies
worked with U.S. trade negotiators and representatives of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to implement a strategy of
“linkage,” whereby the United States consistently refused to ratify
any treaty unless it included provisions bringing all member nations’ intellectual property laws up to U.S. standards.92 An important negotiating point was whether less developed countries would
retain compulsory licensing rights, giving those governments the
power to infringe a patent in certain circumstances, such as if the
nation wanted to manufacture or import a drug that had critical
health consequences for its people but could not reach an agreement over licensing terms with the patent holder.93 For the proponents of TRIPS, these compulsory licensing rights were a form of
governmental or sovereign immunity.
Against this backdrop, the House debated the proposal to repeal state sovereign immunity.94 In a House subcommittee hearing,
Jeffrey Samuels, the Acting Commissioner of the PTO, expressed
the Department of Commerce’s support for the proposal, arguing
91

Scherer, supra note 4, at 203–05.
Id. at 204–05.
93
Id. at 205–06.
94
While not important here, parallel provisions for trademark and copyright
infringement were also debated and passed. See Trademark Remedy Clarification Act,
Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat 3567 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (1992)); Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat 2749
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1990)).
92
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that sovereign immunity squelches the fundamental incentive to
innovate created by the patent law.95 He also argued that failing to
repeal state sovereign immunity “makes a mockery” of U.S. trade
negotiations because the United States had requested that its trading partners eliminate all “nonvoluntary licensing and governmental use provisions” in their patent laws.96 A representative of an
association of 6,000 intellectual property lawyers agreed with that
position.97 Samuels also took the position that Congress did not
need to extend to the states any of the same limitations on liability
that the federal government enjoyed.98
The legislative debate suggests that, to some, it was not clear
how the repeal of sovereign immunity would affect the common
law research exemption under Whittemore. Samuels argued that the
repeal of state sovereign immunity would have “no effect” on the
exemption.99 But Ray Farnbee, Vice Chancellor and General
Counsel at the University of Texas, warned that the bill was overly
broad and as a result, “it will encompass basic research at statesupported colleges and universities which historically have” benefited from a research exemption.100 The perspective of state attorneys general and universities may not have been thoroughly presented because, according to the Senate report, none of them accepted invitations to appear at the hearing.101

95

Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop. and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 47
(1990) (statement of Jeffrey Samuels, Acting Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks, Dep’t
of Com.) (arguing that sovereign immunity “extinguishes the stimulus needed to
innovate”).
96
Id. at 8.
97
Id. at 47 (“We have introduced very strong principles in the [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] proposals and elsewhere to overcome this. To have 50-State carve
outs in our country while we are trying to maintain that posture in these negotiations is
not consistent.”).
98
Id. at 20.
99
Id. at 22. The Chairman specifically asked “what, if any, effect would this change in
law have on the research exemption in patent law as far as State universities are
concerned?” to which Mr. Samuels responded, “In my view, it would have no effect.” Id.
100
Id. at 85.
101
S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3088 (“The
House subcommittee invited state attorneys general and representatives of state
universities to testify, but none accepted the invitation.”).
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The House Committee on the Judiciary essentially adopted the
Bush administration’s position, as articulated by Samuels, and reported favorably on the measure. The Committee argued that sovereign immunity diminishes incentives to innovate, especially for
“the types of inventions that are of particular uses to states, including, for example, auto emission testing processes.”102 The Committee did not address whether the states could rely on public
agencies for those innovations, or whether it made economic sense
to expose all public universities to liability for patent infringement
for the sake of “incentivizing” such a narrow range of developments. The Committee also determined that it was not appropriate
to extend any of the limitations on federal liability to the states.103
The Senate report expressed the same concern about diminishing incentives for innovation, but paid more attention to the way
that sovereign immunity caused disparate treatment between public and private universities, and between state and federal government agencies.104 The Senate report failed to explain why, if the
avowed purpose of the bill was to treat state and federal governments equally, the bill did not extend the same liability limitations
the federal government enjoyed to the states. The measure passed
and became law.105
After the bill passed, the United States failed to procure a concession from less developed countries that would eliminate compulsory licensing in the TRIPS agreement, and compulsory licensing remains an important way for less developed countries to induce pharmaceutical manufacturers into making significant price
concessions.106 In the end, then, the United States’ unsustainable
position on compulsory licensing made a mockery of the debate
over sovereign immunity, at least for a time. It remains to be seen
102

H.R. REP. NO. 101-960(I), at 38 (1990); see also id. at 37 (stating that “public policy
supports the broad applicability of the patent laws” and arguing that States must be liable
in order to protect the “Constitutionally mandated incentive to create”).
103
Id. at 39.
104
S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 8–9, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3094–95
(“Allowing a State to freely infringe upon the protection granted by the Patent Code and
the Trademark Act effectively discourages future innovative.”).
105
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Act Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 35 U.S.C.).
106
Scherer, supra note 4, at 207.
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whether foreign nations will concede to further limitations on
compulsory licensing rights in the Trans-Pacific Partnership or
other future trade agreements.
Several years later, the Supreme Court invalidated the bill and
restored state sovereign immunity from patent infringement liability.107 While Congress had expressly repealed that immunity, the
question was whether Congress had the authority to do so in the
first instance, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Federal Circuit held that Congress had that power.108 The Supreme Court reversed and struck down the law, thereby restoring sovereign immunity to the states.109 But while the
Supreme Court’s decision ostensibly preserves a great deal of academic freedom for scientists at public universities, it has also unfortunately created a legal regime that treats public universities differently from private universities, and the private companies that
collaborate extensively with both types of universities under the
Bayh-Dole regime.
2. Codification of the Research Exemption Does Not Pass
At the same time that the House considered the repeal of state
sovereign immunity, it also considered a proposal to codify the research exemption. As had happened previously, the debate over
the research exemption arose out of a larger debate over the boundaries of patent eligible subject matter. In 1987, the PTO decided
that genetically modified animals are patentable110 and, almost one
year later, issued the first patent on a genetically engineered
mouse.111 The 100th Congress then entertained various bills to codify the PTO’s decision, making genetically modified or “transgenic” animals patentable.

107

Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
108
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
109
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630.
110
Ex parte Allen, No. 86-1790, 1987 WL 123816, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 3, 1987).
111
U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). For a discussion of the
OncoMouse patent, and the disputes it provoked, see infra Section I.G.
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The proposal drew tremendous support from the biotechnology
industry and patent lawyers. Again, those witnesses in favor of patenting transgenic animals viewed “the patent law as an important
incentive for the development of innovations.”112 One intellectual
property lawyer took the usual refrain one step further by making
patents the answer to looming crises of global health and poverty,
arguing that patents on transgenic animals were both necessary and
imperative “to provide an incentive for the agricultural research
and development needed to alleviate predicted world-wide food
shortages.”113
As in previous debates, some remained skeptical about the extent to which the patent system actually incentivizes innovation,
and whether the research exemption might be important for the
patent system to achieve that goal in any event. The Environmental
Policy Institute, for example, “questioned the need for an animal
patent to achieve advances in livestock productivity because we
already have seen advances in agriculture without the incentive of a
patent.”114 The Wisconsin Farmer’s Union argued that publicly
funded research formed the real basis for American biotechnology
industry, and “questioned both the fairness in granting a monopoly
market position to these corporations through a patent, and the necessity of patents to promote scientific progress.”115 Dennis Jelle,
the President of the National Farmer’s Organization, and Tom
Saunders, a dairy farmer, respectively noted that plant patent statutes had caused great amounts of consolidation among seed companies, and that allowing patents for transgenic animals would “result in a less diverse productive base.”116
The original bill making transgenic animals patentable contained a research exemption, but the House Committee on the Judiciary deleted that provision for two reasons: because the Committee believed that the existing common law exemption made the
112

H.R. REP. NO. 100-888, at 6 (1988).
Id. at 12 (summary of testimony of Reid Adler); see also id. at 20 (lawyer Geoffrey
Karny testifying that “prohibiting or delaying patents on transgenic animals could
seriously delay new life-saving medicines and major agricultural breakthroughs”).
114
Id. at 10 (summary of testimony of Jack Doyle); see also id. at 11 (summary of
testimony of Cy Carpenter).
115
Id. at 16 (summary of testimony of Stuart Huber).
116
Id. at 16–17 (summary of testimony of Dennis Jelle and Tom Saunders).
113
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provision “unnecessary,” and because if Congress wanted to codify a research exemption, it would be “desirable” to do so in a way
that “would apply across the board to all patentable inventions”
and not just transgenic animals.117 The Committee also noted that
the international landscape had changed, since Japan and the nations in western Europe had created research exemptions in their
patent laws, and as a result, such a change would not “cause any
serious trade distorting effect.”118 The Committee did not observe
that failing to codify the exemption might cause domestic researchers to relocate their efforts abroad, under more hospitable legal regimes, and potentially undermine the national research effort.
Interestingly, at this point, the Committee was also aware that
the idea that patents are essential for innovation—that the benefits
of stronger patent rights always outweighs the detriments—was
under attack. The Committee dedicated a three page section of its
report to “Patents and Economic Incentives,” noting that “[m]uch
of the sound and fury about the patentability of life forms has been
over whether a patent system is a necessary form of incentive for
innovation, or instead a source of monopoly power.”119 In deciding
the question, the Committee invoked the traditional arguments
that, without patents, there would be no innovation because firms
would free-ride on the innovation of others, or firms would rely on
secrecy instead of making inventions public which would prevent
the dissemination of knowledge.120 Based on these arguments, the
Committee concluded “that the political justification for the patent
system (i.e., an incentive to create) has support in the economic
literature,” but did not really address how the call for a research
exemption would impact that political justification.121

117

H.R. REP. NO. 100-888, at 3, 70.
Id. at 51.
119
Id. at 66–68.
120
Id. at 67. In this general time frame, more modern ideas about cumulative innovation
were only just emerging and this more traditional mode of economic analysis remained
dominant. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842–44 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the
Shoulder of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 30 (Winter
1991).
121
H.R. REP. NO. 100-888, at 68.
118
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During the 101st Congress, the House separated the research
exemption proposal from the transgenic animal proposal, but the
Bush administration opposed the measure. The Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”), whom Congress had asked to evaluate
the research exemption, did not respond to that request.122 The
Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
indicated that the administration opposed legislation creating a research exemption “because it could diminish the strong incentive
provided by the patent system.”123
The House Judiciary Committee reported the measure favorably, despite the administration’s opposition, and included what appears to be the first thorough analysis of the exemption in the
record of public debate. Overall, this part of the report represents a
significant departure from the typical legislative discussion about
the patent system and its relationship to research. For example, the
Committee claimed that “[i]t is a central tenet of American patent
law that there is a right to use scientific information to create new
and better inventions in competition with the patented invention.”124 The Committee then suggested that the Federal Circuit
may have improperly constrained the experimental use doctrine in
holding that it “does not apply if the experimental use [is] coupled
with commercial use.”125 The Committee also recognized that
Bayh-Dole, Stevenson-Wydler, and the FTTA had changed the
relationship between the government and research institutions, and
concluded that, in an era of increasing public-private partnerships,
“government and university scientists should not be confused
about the permissible parameters of their research and experimentation.”126 And finally, the Committee recognized that the exemption made economic sense. Without an exemption, “[u]nnecessary
122

Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1556 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 19 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act Hearing]
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litigation occurs, excessive threats are leveled, transaction costs are
raised,” “experimentation and research are chilled,” and “[m]ore
importantly, legitimate scientific activities are driven outside the
United States.”127 Despite this rather prescient analysis, the measure did not pass.
G. Escalating Disputes Over Access to Research Materials: The NIH
Agreements Regarding the OncoMouse (1998–1999)
In the years following the failed attempt to codify the research
exemption in the PCTIA, several major disputes arose that suggested the patent system was severely out of balance when it comes
to protecting research activity. The first involved the OncoMouse,
a major technological breakthrough in which scientists at Harvard
University engineered mice with a genetic predisposition to developing cancer.128 The technology quickly became an important tool
for scientists studying cancer in humans.
At the time of the discovery, in 1984, it was not yet certain
whether the PTO would issue patents on discoveries like genetically modified mice, thereby extending the logic of the Chakrabarty
decision from bacteria to animals. But, as indicated above, in 1987,
the PTO provided notice that it would issue such patents,129 and it
granted the patent covering the OncoMouse on April 12, 1988.130
Thus, as with other disputes over genetic technologies, the OncoMouse dispute arose at a time when the federal courts and the
PTO were expanding the boundaries of patent eligible subject matter.
The combination of exclusive rights and an aggressive patent licensing strategy subsequently caused a tremendous backlash
among scientific researchers over the OncoMouse. The private
firm, DuPont, had funded the research at Harvard, and under the
127

Id. at 43–44.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1073 (2008).
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terms of the funding agreement, Harvard licensed the technology
to DuPont on an exclusive basis.131 But instead of selling the mice
to researchers, DuPont licensed use of the mice on terms that allowed DuPont to control future scientific inquiry and retain intellectual property rights in future discoveries flowing from the licensed use, a practice that caused considerable controversy in the
research community.132 Disputes over DuPont’s licensing strategy
escalated throughout the 1990s until the National Institutes of
Health (“NIH”) negotiated several memoranda of understanding
in 1998 and 1999 that produced, at best, an uneasy peace. These
memoranda generally made the OncoMouse available to academic
researchers on a royalty-free basis with no reach-through rights on
subsequent innovations.
During debates over codification of the research exemption in
the PCTIA, John Pratt, on behalf of the Association of Independent Research Institutes, argued that the OncoMouse controversy
made the research exemption an important problem deserving congressional action. According to Pratt, inventions like the OncoMouse were essential research tools, and allowing patents on such
tools gave the patent holder the power to stop researchers from
making such tools in their own lab.133 Pratt also argued that patent
holders have already started using licensing techniques to control
the direction, and appropriate the results of, research using basic
tools like the OncoMouse (which Pratt accurately described as “an
attempt to artificially extend the patent holder’s rights beyond the
scope of the invention”).134
Interestingly, social scientists have used the “openness” shock
created by the NIH memoranda to study the impact that DuPont’s
aggressive licensing practices had on innovation outcomes.135 The
authors took advantage of the fact that every genetically engineered
mouse, including those patented by DuPont, is associated with a
publication describing its development and characteristics (a
131

Eisenberg, supra note 128, at 1072–73.
Id. at 1074.
133
1989 Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act Hearing, supra note 122, at 276–78.
134
Id.
135
Fiona Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness on
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“mouse-article”). This allowed the authors to study the level and
nature of follow-on research for each kind of mouse by analyzing
the number and nature of subsequent research publications citing
to the original mouse-article.136 Overall, the authors found that the
NIH agreements increased annual citation rates to mouse-articles
by twenty-one percent,137 while new authors increased by twentytwo to twenty-five percent, new keywords by twenty-five percent,
and new journals by twenty-four percent.138 The authors interpreted the results as yet more proof for the view that such licensing
strategies decrease research intensity and force researchers to
choose different research paths, while openness increases research
intensity.139 Subsequent economic studies suggest that the effect is
felt in a wide variety of industries and is not confined to biotechnology.140
H. The Federal Circuit’s Final Assault on the Research Exemption:
Embrex (2000), Madey (2002), and Merck (2003)
Congress’ failure to codify a research exemption in the PCTIA
cleared the path for the Federal Circuit to resuscitate its interpretation of the common law research exemption as “truly narrow.”
The Federal Circuit made its first move in this direction in a 2000
decision. In Embrex v. Service Engineering Corp., the court was faced
with the question of whether substantial evidence supported a jury
verdict finding that the research exemption did not apply to certain
experiments that the defendant had performed in an attempt to design around the plaintiff’s invention.141 In a per curiam opinion, the
court affirmed the jury’s finding that the defendant had performed
the experiments “expressly for commercial purposes” and that the
136
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research exemption therefore did not apply.142 The court argued
that the common law research exemption remained a “very narrow” doctrine as set forth in Bolar, and that the Hatch-Waxman
Act had not wholly repealed Bolar but had only superseded the decision “on other grounds.”143 Judge Rader wrote a separate concurring opinion to state his own belief that an un-related Supreme
Court opinion144 had precluded any further application of the research exemption, and that even if the doctrine “retains some lingering vitality, the slightest commercial implication will render the
[doctrine] inapplicable.”145
In Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Circuit made its next
move towards rendering the common law research exemption inapplicable in all but the narrowest of circumstances.146 In this case,
physics professor John Madey sued his former employer, Duke
University, alleging that Duke had infringed Madey’s patents covering three pieces of equipment in Duke’s Free Electron Laser laboratory.147 Madey had moved his equipment from Stanford to
Duke when Duke recruited him, but left the equipment behind nine
years later when Duke removed Madey from his position as lab director.148 Duke then continued to use the equipment, causing Madey to sue.149
The district court granted summary judgment in Duke’s favor
on grounds that Duke’s use of the patented equipment fell within
the research exemption announced in Whittemore,150 but the Federal Circuit reversed. The Federal Circuit described its ruling as a
142
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natural outgrowth of binding precedent: “Our precedent, to which
we are bound, continues to recognize the judicially created experimental use defense, however, in a very limited form.”151 The court
was referring to its decision in Bolar.152 According to the Federal
Circuit, the fundamental inquiry was not whether the use of a patented invention for research constituted a socially beneficial use
that Congress never intended to punish. Instead, the Federal Circuit reframed the question as being whether the use was in furtherance of “the institution’s legitimate business objectives,” and
since universities are in the business of research and education, any
use in furtherance of that purpose is patent infringement, regardless of whether the university is a non-profit institution or not.153
With that somewhat circular reasoning, the Federal Circuit effectively rendered the research exemption an almost meaningless doctrine.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Madey,154 but agreed to
hear a case shortly thereafter (Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd.) in which the Federal Circuit attempted to further undermine
the Bolar amendment.155 As indicated above, the Bolar amendment
protects experimental uses of a drug patent “solely for purposes
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law.”156 In Merck, the issue on appeal was
whether that safe harbor protected early-stage experiments that did
not immediately result in an FDA submission, but instead allowed
the experimenter to identify “the best drug candidate to subject to
future clinical testing under FDA processes.”157 The Federal Circuit held that the safe harbor did not protect such uses, arguing
that the safe harbor “does not reach any exploratory research that
rationally form only a predicate for future FDA clinical tests.”158 In
151
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a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court reversed, finding that the scope of the safe harbor was much
broader.159 The Court held that “[t]here is simply no room in the
statute for excluding certain information from the exemption on
the basis of the phase of research in which it is developed or the
particular submission in which it could be included.”160
This decision indicates that a broad research exemption—
much broader than the historical form of the common law exemption—is legally defensible, and if Congress extended the protection
currently afforded to drug researchers to other technological fields,
that legislation would more likely than not survive judicial scrutiny.
Recent economic studies might support such a policy shift. For example, in a major recent study evaluating how a Federal Circuit
decision of invalidity impacts the number of citations to the focal
patent, the authors found that in many technological fields, such a
decision increases citations (suggesting that openness increases
innovation), but found no impact in the case of pharmaceuticals.161
Coincidentally, pharmaceutical research benefited from a strong
statutory research exemption, pursuant to the Bolar amendment
and the Merck decision, during almost the entire time frame that
the authors investigated.162
I. Impeding Research for a Public Purpose: The Dispute Over
Genetically Modified Plants (2009)
After the OncoMouse dispute, the second major controversy
related to the research exemption arose over access to genetically
modified plants, and it suggests a different dimension to the problem that society faces when patent holders control the course of
future research. As Cornell entomologist Elson J. Shields revealed
in a 2009 letter to the Environmental Protection Agency, agricultural technology companies in the United States were, at the time,
using licensing restrictions (similar to those used by DuPont) not to
159
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capture rights in future research, but to prevent research into the
health and environmental consequences of genetically modified
plants.163 Not only did the companies prohibit use of seeds for research in their standard license agreements, they also stopped research they had previously allowed from being published if the results were contrary to the companies’ business interests, and selectively chose researchers based on their perception of who was
“friendly” to agribusiness.164 The dispute was more or less resolved on an ad hoc basis when the American Seed Trade Association conceded some ground in the wake of public outrage over the
Shields’ letter, though an online report from 2010 noted that
“questions remain over whether—and how soon—[the agreement]
will alter what has been a research environment rife with obstructions and suspicion.”165
In this specific setting, the researchers seeking access to the patented invention were not attempting to advance the science of genetically modified crops (in competition with the patent holder) or
use the invention to develop new plants with potential market value. Instead, the researchers were seeking access to the patented
plant material in order to evaluate the health and environmental
consequences of genetically modified crops, an issue of interest to
public health and food safety officials and society at large. The controversy therefore provides a stark reminder that not all science
seeks to advance the technological frontier; much scientific research seeks to ensure that existing technologies are safe for public
use or consumption. Without equitable doctrines like a research
exemption, patent holders have a great deal of power to control the
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nature and quality of information that public officials rely on to
make public policy and guard the public’s safety.
J. Disputes Over Gene Patents in Medical Research and the Myriad
Genetics Decision (2013)
The third major patenting controversy that implicated the research exemption involved the patenting of genes or isolated DNA
sequences. In the 1990s, many biomedical researchers became increasingly concerned about the PTOs practice of issuing patents on
human genes. As a result, in 2001, the PTO proposed guidelines
clarifying that it would issue patents on human DNA sequences so
long as the applicant proved that the discovered sequence was sufficiently useful, which eliminated the practice of applying for a patent based on the DNA sequence alone.166 Yet the question remained: could biomedical researchers use patented DNA sequences in the laboratory to conduct research without infringing
gene patents?
To address the problem, Representative Lynn Rivers introduced a bill during the 107th Congress, the Genomic Research and
Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 (“GRDA”),167 to create a
form of exemption for genetic research. The GRDA proposed to
allow all persons or entities, except those involved in the sale of
pharmaceuticals, to freely use “genetic sequence information for
purposes of research.”168 It also proposed to add genetic testing
(diagnostic, prognostic, and predictive) to the types of “medical
activities” that have immunity under the patent laws.169 Finally, it
proposed to amend the Bayh-Dole Act so that a government contractor must notify the public if it seeks a patent on genetic sequence information.170
In her speech in support of the bill, Representative Rivers described a quandary that would later become a central aspect of a
2013 Supreme Court decision regarding the patentability of
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DNA.171 Specifically, she emphasized that the power to prevent
scientists from doing research on genes seemed strange given that
those genes exist within the human body. Rivers recounted a dispute that had arisen with Miami Children’s Hospital where the
hospital had used tissue samples from children dying of Canavan
disease to identify the gene responsible for their condition, and
then patented the gene and used the patent to prevent others from
researching a cure or diagnosing children without paying a royalty.172 Instead of proposing that genes not be patentable, Representative Rivers simply proposed that the patent law be balanced with
exemptions for research and medical testing.173 The bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee on the day it was introduced, but no further action was taken.
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided that isolated DNA sequences are not patentable174 in a judicial dispute that highlights
the problem with allowing patent owners to dictate the course of
medical research. The defendant in the case, Myriad Genetics, had
successfully patented the isolated DNA sequences for genes in
which mutations are strongly correlated with a risk of developing
breast and ovarian cancer (the BRCA genes).175 Subsequently, the
company took action to prevent all other clinical researchers from
testing to determine if an individual or patient carried such a mutation.176 In addition to stopping those who carry out diagnostic tests,
the patents also created obstacles to those engaged in breast and
ovarian cancer research (as opposed to treating physicians), as researchers must rule out BRCA causation in order to provide a valid

171
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scientific opinion as to alternative causes.177 Myriad took the position that such experiments constituted infringing uses of its patents, and required researchers to pay royalties to conduct such
research.178
By holding that isolated DNA sequences are not patentable, the
Supreme Court provided much needed relief to genetic researchers, and it is clear from the Court’s reasoning that it intended to do
so. For example, the Court noted that the categories of ineligible
subject matter are “the basic tools of scientific and technological
work,” and without these limitations on eligible subject matter,
“there would be considerable danger that the grant of patents
would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit future innovation premised upon them.’”179 In short, the Court was trying
to protect the types of research activity that historically found protection under the common law research exemption. But the Court
attempted to achieve that result through a legal doctrine that is
much more complex and difficult to administer—that of subject
matter eligibility—because it revolves around defining abstract categories of exempted subject matter rather than on protected types
of activity. One way of interpreting the decision, then, is that the
Federal Circuit’s attack on the common law research exemption
has forced the judicial system to seek refuge in other legal doctrines
in order to provide more balance in the patent law.
II. ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY, INSTITUTIONAL BIAS, AND THE
RESEARCH EXEMPTION
As the historical discussion above reveals, there is no single
“research exemption” in American patent law. Rather, the law in
this area is incredibly complex. All researchers, regardless of institutional setting, have fairly broad protection from infringement liability when the experimentation is for the development of a drug or
medical device that will require FDA approval. Also, researchers at
177
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state agencies and universities remain protected from any infringement liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. But
the Federal Circuit has significantly narrowed the reach of the
common law research exemption, which is not limited to any specific subject matter or institutional setting. A series of legal developments have rendered the statutory exemption in the PVPA for
sexually reproduced plants a dead-letter law. It still exists on the
books, but those who innovate in that setting will rarely choose the
PVPA over the Patent Act. And the Supreme Court has more aggressively narrowed (or policed) the boundaries of subject matter
eligibility in order to provide some of the same relief that a broad
research exemption would provide.
The law in this area has evolved in such a complex fashion because of politics. For the last forty years, powerful economic interests have exerted significant influence on federal patent policy, and
powerful economic ideas have significantly influenced the way in
which policymakers across the federal government frame debates
over patent policy. The research exemption provides a robust case
study for analyzing these trends, and bolsters two of the major critiques in the literature on the political economy of patent policy:
first, that much of patent policymaking since the middle of the
1970s is rooted in faulty economic ideology; second, that the Federal Circuit, a specialized court created in part to be the standardbearer of that ideology, exhibits an institutional bias in favor of
strengthening patent rights and weakening doctrines (like the research exemption) that provide equitable counter-balances to
strong patent rights.
A. The Role of Economic Ideology in Contemporary Patent Policy
One of the most striking features in legislative debates over the
research exemption is that those who have historically opposed the
exemption have relied almost exclusively on one idea—the “central dogma” of patent law—to support their position. The basic
hypothesis, repeated throughout the debates, is that the prospect of
patent protection is the primary if not the sole reason that institutions invest in research and innovation, and as a result, any attempt
to diminish the “incentives” that patents create (such as by exempting research activity) will necessarily lead to less innovation
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and hurt the economy. Though individual firms and industry representatives often invoke a version of the central dogma to create
an air of legitimacy when seeking government patronage, the dogma is really a systemic claim about the extent to which a given patent policy will, on balance, increase overall levels of investment
and innovation across all technological settings and industries, irrespective of the impact on one or a few actors.
The main problem with the central dogma is that, despite sixty
years of inquiry, there is no quantitative evidence that the existing
patent system has encouraged or incentivized more innovation in
the United States than would otherwise exist under a different system, such as one including a robust research exemption.180 As Rebecca Eisenberg observed early on, the central dogma fails to answer “the empirical question of how much incentive is necessary
for an optimal level of invention and disclosure,” and is therefore
of little use in determining whether or not a policy like the research
exemption is sound.181
On this point, the political history of the research exemption illustrates in detail a major trend in the political economy of patent
law since the 1970s. As economist William Landes and Judge Richard Posner have argued, since about 1976, patent rights have
greatly expanded because government actors and private firms unflinchingly believed that whatever the reigning free-market ideology said about private property must also be true about intellectual
property.182 This analytical mistake is found repeatedly in the history of the research exemption. The idea that patents incentivize
innovation is just a repackaged version of the fundamental principle
that private property rights provide incentives for socially benefi-
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cial economic activity.183 And the unquestioning belief that this
principle applies to intellectual property, without any proof that it
is true or any serious discussion of the destructive potential inherent in patents, has created a system that gives patent holders a
great deal of power to squelch, control, and delay the very research
and innovation that the patent system is meant to promote.
Economists and social scientists are changing the ways they
model the patent system to correct for inadequacies in the models
that led to the development of the central dogma. The hypothesis
that patents incentivize innovation acquired a great deal of legitimacy from economic models developed in the 1950s, models that
described a limited field of investment behavior, namely private
investments in technological fields where copying is easy and cheap
and where other economic advantages, like first mover advantages,
are not significant. Those models also assumed that invention takes
place in “isolated” settings rather than in “cumulative” contexts
where patented inventions are not just outputs but are inputs to further research. As a result, when addressing the economic pitfalls of
stronger patent protection in debates over the research exemption,
economists and policymakers who relied on these models in prior
decades tended to focus on the traditional problems associated with
monopoly power, like restricted output and high prices on commercial goods that necessarily follow from reduced competition,
rather than on the power to control and prevent further experimentation and product development.184 In the early 1990s, a handful of
lawyers and economists realized that the motivating assumptions in
the early models did not accurately describe the modern research
setting.185 As a result, more modern theories account for the fact
that levels of follow-on innovation will be lower than socially desirable when any of the traditional microeconomic assumptions
breakdown (asymmetric information, high transaction costs, or
183
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coordination problems) and lead to bargaining failures over access
to existing innovations.186
As the history of the research exemption shows, the way in
which economists analyze the costs and benefits of the patent system has not only influenced patent legislation, but has also impacted the way in which jurists conceive of the patent system.
When the Supreme Court indicated, in 1989, that the patent system “reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation
and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without
any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful
Arts’” it was simply importing the then-standard economic justification for the patent system into the meaning of the constitutional
mandate.187 More recently, the Supreme Court has suggested that
“[p]atent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating
‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and
‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed
spur, invention.’”188 This subtle shift in the Court’s exposition of
the patent system’s purposes—from a concern about the danger of
monopoly power to the danger of impeding the flow of information—shows an awareness of the ways in which economic models
of innovation are changing.189 At the same time, no legal principle
requires that the constitutional mandate take on such a purely economic meaning, and history suggests that judges should be wary of
make those kinds of intellectual leaps.190 Any analysis based on
186
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arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research by providing monetary
incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by impeding
the free exchange of information.”).
190
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that it
perverts the Constitution to import the principles of free-market capitalism and Social
Darwinism into the meaning of the Due Process Clause).
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standard microeconomic assumptions will necessarily exclude considerations of equity that are important in a legal setting; any static
equilibrium model will say little about how to facilitate the kind of
dynamic change that is called for in the constitutional command to
“promote the progress of science and the useful arts.”
The power of the central dogma, however, flows not only from
its influence on judicial attitudes towards the patent system, but
also from the pervasive hold it has had in legislative debates. Virtually every Congressional debate from the PVPA to Bayh-Dole,
Hatch-Waxman, and the PCTIA has taken place under the presumption that strong patent rights provide an almost unmitigated
social benefit with virtually no costs or risks. Executive officials in
the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations more or less espoused that same view, as their testimony makes clear.191 Even
when Congress anticipated that patents could be used in a way that
risked causing harm to public health and safety during the BayhDole debates, it constructed an onerous set of safeguards to protect
against those risks.192 But as the controversies surrounding the OncoMouse, genetically modified plants and seeds, and the BRCA
genes suggest, these risks are increasingly becoming routine and
their resolution is demanding more and more government resources.193 Except for the House Judiciary Committee report on
the proposal to codify a research exemption as part of the PCTIA,
no government agency has thoroughly considered the larger set of
risks (beyond monopoly power and health and safety concerns)
that flow from the proliferation of patent rights and licensing practices aimed at suppressing innovation.
Those who advocated in favor of research exemptions did not
adhere so rigidly to economic dogma, and proposed a variety of
reasons why a robust exemption is needed as a matter of public policy. Experimentation is arguably a type of conduct that no Congress has ever intended to punish. In a post-Bayh-Dole world, the
research exemption would also allow public and private researchers
to buttress their research budgets with additional revenue from
commercial sales, while immunizing the underlying activity that
191
192
193

See, e.g., text accompanying supra notes 21, 69, 95, 119–21, 123.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Sections I.G, I.I, I.J.
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promotes technological progress for the benefit of all. It might minimize and in some cases eliminate transaction costs associated
with research activity, thus removing a significant tax on research.
It would normalize, to a degree, the impact that the patent law has
on private and public universities, the latter being protected under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity while the former is not. It
should provide an important check on the ability of patent holders
to extend the temporal and substantive scope of their patent
beyond the boundaries of the initial grant. It would protect the ability of researchers to study the health and environmental consequences of new technologies in the marketplace without undue interference. And it may prevent the outsourcing of research, given
that most advanced economies have adopted an exemption in one
form or another. All of these arguments have been raised in favor of
a research exemption.
The debates over the research exemption also demonstrate just
how much of modern patent policy is born of a perceived need to
use patents to promote the ability of domestic firms to compete in
an increasingly global economy. The PVPA of 1970 (and its research exemption) was born of a desire to help domestic agricultural firms compete with European business, the Bayh-Dole Act was
avowedly meant to increase the productivity of American businesses so that they can compete with firms in Japan and elsewhere, and
the TRIPS agreement and the attempt to repeal state sovereign
immunity at home were related efforts to get foreign firms to conform to U.S. patent standards. In a sense, then, the political history
of the exemption also illustrates the impact that globalization had,
in this time frame, on economic thinking about patents and monopoly power. As David Hart puts it, “[p]olicies that had previously
been seen in the national market to be concentrationist, fostering
collusion to suppress innovation, came to be seen as deconcentrationist in the global market, overcoming collective action problems
that inhibited innovation.”194 From this perspective, the central
dogma was never intended to be an empirically defensible claim
about innovation; it was just a veneer used to legitimate policies
that allowed incumbent firms to acquire more economic power and
194

David M. Hart, Antitrust and Technological Innovation in the U.S.: Ideas, Institutions,
Decisions, and Impacts, 1890–2000, 30 RES. POL’Y 923, 930 (2001).

616

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:573

which insulated domestic firms, to a degree, from foreign competition.
As indicated above, the central dogma—the basis for so much
patent policy in the 1970s and 1980s—did not go unchallenged forever. Unfortunately, by the time these challenges began to appear,
the last major political opportunity for codifying a broad exemption
(as part of the PCTIA195) had passed. With no congressional debate
or action on the subject for the next twenty-five years, the locus of
debate shifted back to the Federal Circuit.
B. Institutional Bias at the Federal Circuit
Another prominent critique in the study of the political economy of patent policy is that the Federal Circuit, as a specialized
court, exhibits an institutional bias in its decision-making and is
prone to a subtle form of regulatory capture.196 Landes and Posner,
for example, argue that “a specialized court is more likely to have a
‘mission’ orientation than a generalist court,” that the Federal
Circuit “has defined its mission as promoting technological
progress by enlarging patent rights,” and that the Federal Circuit
exhibits a strong bias in favor of enlarging patent rights and increasing the demand for services from its primary constituency: patent
lawyers.197 Scherer emphasizes that this concern was very much
present at the time of the court’s creation and that, in the enabling
legislation, Congress ignored warnings that such a specialist court
“may be ‘captured’ by special interest groups” and that uniformity
in federal patent law “is quite plainly not a desirable objective.”198
The Federal Circuit has unquestionably exhibited an institutional bias against doctrines like the research exemption. The court
195

H.R. REP. NO. 101-960(I), at 41 (1990).
The mechanism might best be characterized as one of “cultural capture,” a channel
for obtaining regulatory actions that serve private industry but which “operates through a
set of shared but not explicitly stated understandings about the world.” James Kwak,
Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 79 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds.,
2013).
197
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 26–27.
198
Scherer, supra note 4, at 187–88 (quoting Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D.
195, 236 (1975)).
196
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first attempted to eliminate the reach of the common law research
exemption in the context of pharmaceutical patents in Bolar (1984).
Though Congress swiftly rejected that action by creating a statutory exemption for research connected to FDA submissions, the
Federal Circuit remained committed to its original view and essentially eliminated what was left of the common law exemption (as
applied to other technological domains) in Embrex (2000) and Madey (2002). The court has also been receptive to arguments that
Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from
infringement liability in a patent context (Florida Prepaid, 1998),
and even attempted to narrow the scope of the Bolar exemption in
Merck (2003). All of these actions are consistent with a strong ideological commitment to eliminating or narrowing immunities and
exemptions from infringement liability, even those that have a firm
statutory basis.
Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that Congress has effectively delegated policymaking power to a judicial venue where
judges are bound to follow precedent and do not readily embrace a
policymaking role. Congress explicitly created the Federal Circuit
“to strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to
foster technological growth and industrial innovation” and to
“provide nationwide uniformity in patent law.”199 And yet, some
of the judges have indicated that they have difficulty achieving
those objectives within the confines of their institutional setting.
Judge Michel has publicly lamented the court’s insularity and described its process as an echo chamber, while Judge Rader has decried the fact that the court’s institutional arrangement seems to
stunt the pace of common law development.200 When faced with
criticism that the court does not incorporate social science scholarship in their decision-making, some of the judges (including Michel) defaulted to the traditional view that federal courts do not set
policy but simply apply existing law to the facts.201
At the same time, none of the Court’s decisions concerning the
research exemption appear to rest on such firm precedent that the
199

H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 4 (1981).
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101
NW. U.L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2007).
201
Id. at 1648 n.102.
200
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Federal Circuit can reasonably claim to have had its hand forced. In
two of the six decisions (Florida Prepaid and Merck), the Supreme
Court actually reversed the Federal Circuit. In a third decision (Bolar), the Federal Circuit showed some selection bias in choosing
what precedent to rely on, and ultimately precipitated a congressional repeal—an uncommon event in patent law. Though the two
most recent opinions narrowing the common law research exemption (Embrex and Madey) have evaded Supreme Court review, neither seems to have indisputably firm roots in legal precedent, especially since both effectively rely on Bolar.
Factors like the timing of the judicial appointment (before or after the creation of the Federal Circuit) or the political affiliation of
the appointing president do not persuasively explain the court’s
institutional bias in the small set of decisions considered in this paper. As the table below shows, though five of the six panels were
composed of judges appointed independently to the Federal Circuit after 1982, the one exception—Bolar—is the opening salvo in
the court’s attempts to narrow or eliminate the common law research exemption. The political affiliation of the appointing president also seems to have played an ambiguous role, despite the
strong presence of Republican-appointees on the court. Five of the
six panels were composed of at least two judges appointed by Republican presidents, but the one exception—Madey—arguably
represents the most significant attack, since Bolar, on the common
law exemption.
Federal
Circuit
Case
Bolar202

202

Judges
(opinion author
in bold)
Howard Markey

Appointing President
and Year (party)
Nixon 1972 to CCPA (R)

Patent
Background
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Philip Nichols, Jr.
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Shiro Kashiwa
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Roche Pods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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A stronger case could be made for the idea that judges with a
patent background—and all the ideological baggage that comes
with it—are biased against doctrines like the research exemption,
at least from the year 2000 forward. Even more notable is the
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Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
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Embrex v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curium).
205
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
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Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated,
545 U.S. 193 (2005).
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prominent presence in the decisions of those who were affiliated
with the court’s founding; though even here, specific individuals
amongst the subset of those affiliated with the court’s founding
have exhibited strong ideological bias against the research exemption, while others have offered strong support. Judge Markey, then
a judge on the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, ultimately
testified in favor of creating the Federal Circuit. Before doing so,
he argued that the main problem with obtaining consistency in the
patent law was the federal courts’ frequent reliance upon judicial
tests that were not rooted in statutory language.208 That critique
suggests that Judge Markey believed the common law should develop in a very restricted manner in the context of patent cases.
Judge Rader served on the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in the
1980s, during the time that the bill to establish the Federal Circuit
was being debated, and since his appointment to the court, he has
taken a very strident view towards the research exemption. In both
Embrex and Merck, Judge Rader articulated perhaps the strongest
ideological bias against the research exemption (in both common
law and statutory forms).209 Judge Newman played a role in organizing corporate patent counsel to lobby Congress when the bill to
create the Federal Circuit was stalled.210 At the same time, she has
also provided one of the strongest defenses of the research exemption on the judicial record.211
Consistent with other studies that look for institutional bias at
the Federal Circuit in the development of doctrine,212 the history of
debates over the research exemption illustrate a significant institu208

Paul M. Janicke, To Be or Not to Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 657–59 (2002).
209
See, e.g., Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353 (Rader, J., concurring) (“Even if the experimental
use excuse retains some lingering vitality, the slightest commercial implication will render
the . . . doctrine inapplicable, as occurs in the court’s resolution today.”).
210
Pauline Newman, Origins of the Federal Circuit: The Role of Industry, 11 FED. CIRC.
B.J. 541, 543 (2002) (“We didn’t know why this reluctance existed, but out marched the
corporate patent counsel . . . . We brought the industrial might of the nation. We brought
our chief executives and our research directors and our union leaders. The industries that
were now working to create this court represented three-quarters of the nation’s
industrial product.”).
211
Merck, 331 F.3d at 872–78 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212
See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Nard & Duffy, supra note 200.
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tional bias against common law exemptions and immunities, a bias
that seems to originate from shared understandings and ideologies
about the way the patent system works and the Federal Circuit’s
role in shaping patent law. But the history of the research exemption also suggests some deeper problems associated with the delegation of policymaking authority to a judicial forum where the ideological biases of certain individuals can be significantly amplified,
and where policy is made without the benefit of public hearing, fact
gathering, and debate that goes beyond the interests of the private
litigants.
CONCLUSION
The temporal evolution in federal policy concerning the idea of
exempting research activity from infringement liability provides an
interesting case study in the political economy of patent policy, one
that illustrates two of the main themes in the field. The un-nuanced
economic ideology that pervades legislative debates over the research exemption, embodied in the central dogma, appears to have
influenced a great deal of judicial and legislative analysis of patent
policy over the course of the last forty years. The implantation of
this ideology into the Patent Clause of the Constitution is cause for
special concern because it means that almost all legal analysis of the
patent system takes place under an analytical framework that is
wholly unconcerned with questions of equity, protecting public
health and safety, or promoting progress (divorced from profit),
and which leaves very little room for integrating patent law with
the objectives of other economic policy domains.
The Federal Circuit has a fairly strong institutional bias against
liability exemptions and immunities. One plausible explanation for
that bias is that Congress created the Federal Circuit with a specific
mission, one rooted in certain ideological precepts about the role of
the patent system in the American economy and the role of the
judges in strengthening that system, and that this ideological
framework favors expanding and strengthening rights of individual
patent holders rather than strengthening the innovative capacity of
the system as a whole. This ideological bias may be exacerbated by
the fact that much policy, in this area, is made in an institutional
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setting that hears individual disputes and does not (always) embrace the idea of itself as an institution responsible for setting systemic policy.
A temporal or chronological approach to studying the political
economy of patent policy provides certain benefits over more expansive, systemic studies. Among those benefits is the ability to
embed attitudes towards a specific policy within historical context,
and examine the relationship between the policy and other related
developments in the broader domain of patent law. The perspectives of those who opposed or supported the research exemption
did not develop in isolation. At the very least, those opinions were
shaped by the economic recession of the late 1970s, concerns about
the competitiveness of American industry in a global economy, international debates over patent standards, judicial developments
regarding sovereign immunity, and a whole host of developments
regarding patent eligible subject matter. Such an approach also reveals how the constituencies of advocates for and opponents to the
research exemption change with time. For example, the shift from
opposition to support amongst some groups of patent lawyers, and
the surprising emergence of strident opposition from university
officials, is much more visible in this type of vertical, issue-specific
analysis.
Though the political history of the research exemption provides
much fuel for skeptics about the real benefits of patent law, the
news is not all bad. Granted, the complexity of policymaking in this
area and the contingencies of history have led to an unnecessarily
complicated legal framework when it comes to the research exemption. And much of the political history told herein proves that those
with economic power and an interest in perpetuating the status quo
are, predictably, very good at getting at what they want. But Congress has on two separate occasions enacted some form of a statutory research exemption, and on one of those occasions—the Bolar
amendment—Congress created one of the strongest exemptions in
the world in terms of the amount of protected activity. Congress
did so, amazingly, in the one industry where most economists and
policymakers agree that patents are actually important for eliciting
private investments. Perhaps more importantly, the House has al-
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ready considered one such proposal and its report213 on the matter
provides a solid foundation for further debate—debate that should
at least account for changes in economic analysis of the patent system over the last twenty years. The time is therefore ripe for Congress to revisit the research exemption.
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H.R. REP. NO. 101-960(I) (1990).

